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Managerial Incentives and Investment Policy in Family 
Firms: Evidence from a Structural Analysis 
by Mieszko Mazur and Betty H.T. Wu 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
This paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay mediates the effect of family preferences on corporate 
investment policy. Our study focuses on the option portfolio volatility sensitivity vega, which motivates the risk-
taking behavior of undiversified managers. After controlling for factors that affect incentive pay and investment 
policy simultaneously, we find that one-third of underinvestment in riskier R&D projects in active family firms 
can be attributed to a significantly lower vega. Passive family firms allocate more capital to R&D as opposed to 
active family firms, and are more active in M&A deal making. In contrast to many prior studies, pay incentives 
and families are not associated with capital expenditures. Overall, our empirical results suggest that CEO pay 
incentives induce investment policy contingent on firm risk. Family CEO incentive pay manifests the family 
preference for lower risk, especially in firms with higher firm risk. Nonetheless, after replacing family CEOs 
with outside professionals, investments in both R&D and M&A increase, which is consistent with the family 
preference for extended investment horizons. Interestingly, such a preference seems not to be manifested in 
incentive pay. 
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Introduction 
Existing academic literature highlights the importance of family firms (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung, 2000; Faccio and Lang, 
2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In terms of prevalence, La Porta et al. (1999) 
report that approximately 53% of publicly listed firms around the world are controlled by families. Similarly, 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that 37% of the U.S. firms listed on Fortune 500 are founding family firms. 
Firms controlled by families differ importantly from non-family firms. For instance, family firms are more 
likely to have reduced conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, but greater conflict of interest 
between controlling and minority shareholders (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010). Furthermore, family 
firms perform better as compared to non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a), they are less diversified 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006), and they have significantly different compensation structures (Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana, and Makri, 2003).  
This paper extends existing literature by investigating the relation between family involvement, managerial 
incentives, and investment decisions in family firms. Prior research notes that large and undiversified 
shareholders might adopt investment policy based on their own risk preferences and/or their own investment 
horizons rather than those preferred by other well-diversified shareholders (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1985; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gompers and Lerner, 2000). Alternatively, some academic scholars argue that 
blockholders can mitigate managerial incentives to adopt myopic investments (e.g., Edmans, 2009). Anderson, 
Duru, and Reeb (2012) study the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy from the 
perspective of different preferences between family and nonfamily shareholders. They find that family firms 
devote less capital to long-term investments, which indicates that family firms affect investment decisions by 
their preferences for lower risk rather than efficient monitoring or longer horizons. 
In this study, different from existing research on investment choices in family firms (e.g., Anderson et al., 
2012), we examine the new channel through which families exert influence on corporate investment policy. The 
channel we identify involves managerial incentives, which have been shown to have a more direct effect on 
investment decisions made by firms. More specifically, we use two generally accepted measures of managerial 
incentives widely used in the literature: stock option delta and stock option vega (e.g., Core and Guay, 2002; 
Brockman, Martin, and Unlu, 2010). Stock option delta measures monetary change in manager’s wealth when 
firm’s stock price changes. Higher delta should induce managers to expand effort in searching out new 
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investment opportunities; however, delta’s impact on managerial risk-taking is theoretically and empirically 
ambiguous (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). On the other hand, stock option 
vega measures the monetary change in the wealth of the manager when firm’s risk changes. Higher vega should 
make managers more willing to take risks.  
In our analysis, we focus primarily on stock option vega because, in addition to a solid theoretical foundation 
(e.g., Haugen and Senbet, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985), vega provides a straightforward measure of managerial 
risk-taking incentives with an intuitive appeal: it tells us directly how much the manager will be better (worse) 
off, when firm risk increases (decreases). Moreover, vega can help explain why some firms spend more on risky 
investments (e.g., innovation that is key to firm/economic growth). In our study, we aim to understand to what 
extent vega mediates family preference for three types of investments, including capital expenditures, research 
and development (R&D), and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which reflect varying degrees of riskiness. To 
identify family firms, following Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we manually 
check the proxy statements and other sources when needed. Because the vast majority of the families identified 
in our sample are in fact founding families, we focus on the founding family, and thus “family” refers to the 
founding family in the remainder of the paper. We classify our sample firms as active family firms (run by 
family member CEOs), passive family firms (run by outside professional CEO), and nonfamily firms. 
We make several contributions to the literature on family firms. First and foremost, to the best of our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze the effect of family involvement on investment decisions through 
CEO pay sensitivities. There have been a number of studies that examine CEO compensation in family firms 
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) as well as their investment decisions (Anderson et al., 2012), but none of them 
attempts to consider these two key factors simultaneously. Arguably, the differences observed in the CEO pay 
structure in family firms are able to explain the differences in investment policy in these firms. Our study fills 
the gap with better analytical tools that are able to address issues such as endogeneity and/or missing values. 
Different from Anderson et al. (2012), we assume that investment decisions on capital expenditures and R&D 
are made simultaneously, and we consider M&A as another important choice of investment policy. Our results 
indicate that CEO compensation is an important and effective governance mechanism that reflects large owner 
preferences for certain investment behavior. Furthermore, our empirical evidence supports the notion that active 
family firms design different incentive pay structures that not only reflect their unique preferences, but also 
further affect their choices of investment policy. 
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Second, we refine the typical categorization of "family versus nonfamily" firms in terms of the degree of 
family ownership. Similar to, for example, Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Barontini and Caprio (2006), we 
classify firms into three different types that reflect varying degrees of family involvement both in terms of stock 
ownership as well as the top management. Indeed, we find that the incentives and the investment patterns appear 
to differ significantly in active family firms, as opposed to passive and nonfamily firms, a result that could not 
be captured by the traditional family firm categorization. In fact, adopting this traditional classification approach 
gives us results similar to Anderson et al. (2012). Hence, a CEO’s family affiliation is a valid and important 
criterion for classifying family firms in a more appropriate manner. This also suggests that replacing a family 
CEO with an outside professional means not only different behavior from the past but, more importantly, 
commencement of the transition to a nonfamily firm. 
Finally, previous studies from the corporate investment literature usually focus on firm-specific attributes. 
Several studies explore how managerial incentives influence observable operations and policy choices in 
addition to the resulting implications (e.g., Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; 
DeYoung, Peng, and Yan, 2013). Our analysis incorporates the aspect of organizational structure by considering 
ownership (ownership structure) and control (management) at the same time. In line with Anderson et al. 
(2012), we demonstrate that owner preferences also matter in the choice of corporate investment policy. 
Because the influence of family ownership is beyond that of typical concentrated ownership (e.g., Mazur and 
Wu, 2014), research on incentive compensation and corporate investment policy without considering family 
presence could result in spurious relations and false implications.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: (1) brief literature review followed by formulation of 
testable hypothesis; (2) description of our data, sample selection, and methodology; (3) presentation of empirical 
results; (4) discussion and practical implications; and (5) concluding remarks.  
Theoretical Foundation 
Corporate Investment Policy in Family Firms 
Family firms have several distinctive features as opposed to nonfamily firms. Family firms are more capable 
of overcoming the free-rider problem that hinders effective monitoring in diffusely-held firms due to the 
concentrated ownership of families (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Family managers can also create altruistic 
effects that are beneficial to stakeholders (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, and Buchholtz, 2001). In addition, family 
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members tend to accumulate wealth through their businesses, so they are less likely to have an opportunistically 
short time horizon during the decision-making process (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Bartholomeusz and 
Tanewski, 2006).1 This has particularly significant implications for investment choices in family firms. With 
such long-term commitments and perspectives to ensure firm prosperity (often intertwined with family 
reputation), coupled with effective monitoring from ownership, families can conceivably avoid the myopic 
behavior typically observed in nonfamily firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Stein, 1988; Edmans, 2009).2 These 
arguments formulate the investment horizon hypothesis, indicating that family firms devote more capital to 
long-term and riskier projects relative to nonfamily firms. 
In addition, rational information asymmetry models by, e.g., Holmstrom (1979) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984), postulate that managers are better informed than the shareholders about the prospects of the firm, and 
thus must be given some discretion in the decision making process. When managers’ and shareholders’ interests 
coincide, managers do not exploit their information advantage at the expense of shareholders, resulting in no 
misallocation of investments and no reduction in firm value. Following this line of reasoning, family firms 
should make better investment decisions, especially when these firms are run by families who provide effective 
monitoring. This would be supported by the standard q-theory of investment (e.g., Brainard and Tobin, 1968; 
Tobin, 1969), which argues that the determinant of investment is the market valuation of a firm’s assets and 
predicts a positive association between q (market valuation of additional unit of invested capital, or investment 
productivity) and investment rate. Existing empirical research finds that family firms have significantly higher q 
as compared to non-family firms (e.g., Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the concentrated ownership of families itself gives rise to strong risk aversion. Because their 
wealth largely depends on firm prosperity, compared with well-diversified shareholders, families have a greater 
tendency to mitigate firm risk especially by affecting long-term investment choices (Anderson et al., 2012). The 
uncertainties of long-term investments potentially increase the levels of idiosyncratic risk, which small 
shareholders can diversify but families cannot. Moreover, greater risk aversion suggests a higher discount rate 
                                                          
1 For instance, a family firm in Japan founded in 578 has gone through 40 generations for building temples. It maintains a 
long-term horizon and aims to pursue innovative technology. It also values tradition and customer satisfaction, in managing 
business (http://www.kongogumi.co.jp/idea.html). 
2 Managerial myopia models (e.g., Stein, 1988; Edmans, 2009) explain why managers may choose to focus more on short-
term earnings rather than long-run interests of the firm. These models posit that some investors will never accept weak short-
term earnings, because weak earnings tend to depress stock prices. Therefore, managers may fail to invest in long-term 
innovative ventures, if such investments mean lower short-term earnings. Firms with atomistic shareholders and the 
separation of ownership and control, are more likely to have impatient investors that may sell their equity-holdings, once 
current profits fall short of their expectations. As a result, managers of such firms may be more inclined to make short-
sighted investment decisions that maximize short-term profits at the expense of long-term value creation. 
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that, in effect, shortens investment horizons (Anderson et al., 2012). These arguments develop the risk aversion 
hypothesis, which predicts fewer long-term and riskier investments in family firms than in nonfamily firms.  
Capital expenditures and R&D expenses are two items that publicly-traded firms are required by regulators 
to disclose in their accounting statements and proxy for corporate long-term investments. R&D spending is 
typically considered riskier, with longer investment horizons relative to capital expenditures. R&D spending 
provides more long-term benefits than capital expenditures. For instance, Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) 
show that innovative efficiency of R&D investment displays itself over an extended time path (even beyond 50 
years), whereas other classes of expenditures have more immediate effect. R&D projects are regarded as high-
risk investments due to a higher level of information asymmetry and uncertainty regarding investment duration 
and outcome, among other reasons. Kothari, Laguerre, and Leone (2002), for example, document a significantly 
higher uncertainty of economic benefits of R&D spending as compared to other types of expenditure.3 Hence, 
families should be more risk averse to R&D investments. Anderson et al. (2012) use the 2000 largest U.S. firms 
from 2003 to 2007 and test the two hypotheses that predict the opposing effects of family firms on investment 
policy. The authors find a negative relation between family firms and capital allocation to riskier R&D projects 
and argue that the risk aversion hypothesis dominates the horizon hypothesis in regard to investment policy in 
family firms. In contrast, Anderson and Reeb (2003b) demonstrate that family firms diversify less than 
nonfamily firms as well as maintaining similar levels of debt to them. This evidence does not support the risk 
aversion hypothesis. 
Similar to Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), in this paper, we identify family 
firms by two criteria, CEO family affiliation and family ownership, accounting for firm control and ownership 
structure at the same time. As a result, we have three types of family firms: active family firms (run by family 
member CEOs), passive family firms (run by outside professional CEOs), and nonfamily firms that represent 
varying degrees of family involvement within firms, i.e., the highest in active family firms (because families 
own and control these firms), followed by passive family firms (because families own but do not control these 
firms), and the lowest in nonfamily firms (as no family presence in these firms), respectively.4 Usually passive 
family firms are considered as a transition phase in which families start loosening their control/ownership. 
Following the two competing hypotheses proposed by Anderson et al. (2012), risk aversion and investment 
horizon hypotheses, we formalize our predictions in our first hypothesis that consists of two parts. 
                                                          
3 Kothari et al. (2002) indicate that R&D is associated with a higher variability of future operating income than capital 
expenditures by approximately 30%-70%. 
4 We adopt a conservative approach to classify family firms in a sense that we do not consider family members working as 
managers because they would not be able to exert influence as much as CEOs. 
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Hypothesis 1a: In active family firms (run by family member CEOs), family risk aversion dominates family 
preference for extended investment horizons, resulting in lower long-term investments (e.g., R&D) as compared 
to non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 1b: In passive family firms (run by outside professional CEOs), family preference for extended 
investment horizons dominates family risk aversion, resulting in higher long-term investments (e.g., R&D) as 
compared to non-family firms. 
CEO Incentive Pay and Corporate Investment Policy 
Option delta and vega are effectively the slope and convexity, respectively, of the CEO pay-performance 
relation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In other words, delta is for the purpose of incentive alignment, which 
provides a remedy for the agency problem due to separation of ownership and control. Vega is for the risk-
taking incentive in response to CEO risk aversion because of the undiversifiable wealth concerns, which is 
similar to diverging risk tolerances between large and small shareholders discussed in the previous section. 
On the theoretical front, it is commonly argued that convex payoffs of stock options make risk more 
valuable to managers and thus should be able to mitigate managerial risk aversion and provide incentives for 
them to undertake risky investments. However, this depends on the managerial utility function. Guay (1999) and 
Ross (2004) indicate that the concavity of the utility function of a risk-averse manager can significantly offset 
the incentives from the convexity of pay structure. In addition, models developed by Haugen and Senbet (1981), 
and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that firms should manage the sensitivity of managers’ wealth to the volatility 
(riskiness) of firm’s equity. This is because managers should be rewarded for risk-increasing positive NPV 
investment projects that the firm desires to undertake. Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2002) illustrate that a call option 
contract can induce not only too much but also too little risk-taking behavior. Moneyness of options can have 
different impacts on risk-taking behavior: Out-of-the-money or at-the-money options induce better risk-taking 
behavior than in-the-money options (Lewellen, 2003; Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach, 2005). Empirically, 
several studies link managerial stock and/or option holdings to financial strategies as well as corporate focus, 
with mixed results.5 The evidence on firm risk is more consistent: Return volatility is positively associated with 
the pay-risk sensitivity (Guay, 1999; Cohen, Hall, and Viceira, 2000). This also implies that firms actively 
manage risk-taking incentives. 
                                                          
5 See, e.g., Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), DeYoung et al. (2013), Mehran (1995), and 
Rogers (2002). 
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Corporate investments are crucial to firm valuation and performance. Different investment types have 
varying degrees of outcome uncertainty and horizon. The extant literature indicates that vega affects managerial 
decisions on investment policy. Coles et al. (2006) find that vega increases R&D, diversification, and leverage 
and decreases capital expenditures after controlling for delta and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on 
managerial compensation. Similarly, Nam, Ottoo, and Thornton Jr. (2003) also find that vega is related to more 
leverage and higher levels of R&D. Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) indicate that vega increases risk-inducing 
mergers in the banking industry after controlling for delta and other firm-specific and governance attributes. 
DeYoung et al. (2013) further demonstrate that vega increases risk-taking business policies at large U.S. 
commercial banks and that bank boards respond to higher-than-average levels of risk by moderating CEO risk-
taking incentives. 
Despite the clear effect of vega on corporate investments, the relation between delta and risk-taking is 
ambiguous. Theoretically, delta motivates managerial efforts to identify positive NPV projects that can be risky. 
On the other hand, such (a high level of) riskiness can expose managers to a level that exacerbates risk aversion 
(Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011), especially when high-delta compensation over time makes managerial wealth 
closely linked to the firm (DeYoung et al., 2013). These opposing predictions might explain the inconsistent 
findings in empirical studies (e.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman, 2001; Coles et al., 2006). 
CEO Incentive Pay in Family Firms 
The bulk of managerial incentives are generated by executive stock options and option-like payouts, as well 
as by the ownership of firm’s equity-holdings (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998). Stock 
options are a large component of executive compensation package. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) report 
that equity-based pay constitutes, on average, over 50 percent of a typical executive pay package. As for the 
ownership of firm’s equity, it can be accumulated by executives over the length of their tenures at the firm. 
Alternatively, in family firms equity stakes are typically retained by a founder(s) at the initial public offering 
(IPO) and then plausibly pass on to the descendant(s). Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007) report that insiders 
keep on average 38% of firm’s ownership within the first year of the IPO, and 24% within the first ten years 
after going public. Because of large equity ownership as typically held by families, their exposure to firm risk is 
high: wealth of families depends heavily on firm performance.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is still little research that examines the relation between family firms and 
CEO compensation. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003) first investigate the determinants of executive compensation in 
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publicly-traded family firms in the U.S., and they find that family CEOs of family-controlled firms receive 
lower total income than outside professional CEOs, the income difference increasing with family ownership 
concentration. In addition, their pay tends to be more insulated from systematic risk, which is further moderated 
by the presence of institutional investors and R&D intensity. They argue that institutional investors might 
reduce equity-based income to avoid conservative decisions in an already risk-averse family business context. 
Mazur and Wu (2014) study small publicly-traded firms in the U.S. and find that cash and total compensation 
seem unaffected by family presence. Delta is highest in firms controlled and run by families.  
Together, these studies imply that family firms should have different investment policies affected by their 
incentive pay in place. These studies also suggest that managerial incentives represent a channel through which 
firms influence managers’ investment behavior. As noted before, our primary variable of interest is stock option 
vega, and we use delta as a control variable in the analysis because of its ambiguous effect on risk taking. In 
light of above discussion, we formulate our next hypothesis as follows, 
Hypothesis 2: CEO incentive pay manifests family preferences and thus mediates the relations between families 
and investment choices, such that CEO stock option vega is lower in active family firms and higher in passive 
family firms. 
Additionally, we expect that the aforementioned predictions should be affected by the riskiness of a firm. 
Specifically, if family preference for low risk prevails, the negative relation between active family firms and 
risky investments should be more pronounced in high-risk firms. Alternatively, if family preference for 
investment horizons prevails, the positive relation between passive family firms and risky investments should 
not be significantly different between high- and low-risk firms. If anything, such a relation might be more 
pronounced in low-risk firms (due to the increased risk-aversion preference in high-risk firms). The above 
predictions can be formulated as follows, 
Hypothesis 3a: In active family firms, family risk aversion dominates family preference for extended investment 
horizons, resulting in lower long-term investments (e.g., R&D) as compared to non-family firms. Such a 
prediction is expected to be more prominent in high-risk firms. 
Hypothesis 3b: In passive family firms, family preference for extended investment horizons dominates family 
risk aversion, resulting in higher long-term investments (e.g., R&D) as compared to non-family firms. Such a 
prediction is expected not to be affected by firm risk. 
Methods 
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Data and Sample     
Following Mazur and Wu (2014), we form our sample from companies in the S&P600 SmallCap Index 
between 2001 and 2005, the most recent period with no major disruptive economic events. Our analysis focuses 
on small companies to avoid the aggregation bias, i.e., the aggregation of asynchronous actions across business 
units can smooth firm-level investment, which potentially arises with firm size (Whited, 2006). In addition, 
other than the economic significance, family influence is more prominent and effective in small firms compared 
with their more established counterparts. Our sample starts in 2001, so that we can avoid market-based 
performance measures that were significantly inflated in 2000 when the dot-com bubble reached its climax. Our 
sample ends in 2005 because the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission introduced new disclosure rules on 
executive pay in 2006; thus, the most recent compensation data are not fully compatible with the pre-2006 
format. Therefore, our sample period is relatively free of major financial or regulatory events as well. We 
exclude firms in this index that did not survive the full sample period, ensuring that our sample firms remain 
relatively small. Similar to Anderson et al. (2012), we further exclude utility (SIC codes 1311, 4911 to 4991) 
and financial firms (SIC codes 6020 to 6799) because these firms are typically under government regulations 
that might affect their investment policies and ownership structures. We also exclude spin-off firms. These 
sample selection criteria result in 1,756 firm-year observations that represent 362 unique firms. We match our 
final sample with the available accounting data in Compustat, compensation data in ExecuComp,6 corporate 
governance data in RiskMetrics, mergers and acquisitions data in SDC (Securities Data Company), stock price 
data in CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices), and patent data in Bronwyn Hall’s online database.   
To identify family firms, we manually check proxy statements for each company along with other sources 
when needed,7 providing us with the following information: identity, ownership, tenure, and biographies of 
founder(s), board members, blockholders, and the top-five managers when such information is available. We 
classify family firms based on two dimensions, namely, family affiliation of board members (control) and of 
CEOs (management). Following Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we classify a 
firm with family control as long as one of the following two criteria is met: (1) The founder or a descendant of 
the founder sits on the board and/or is a blockholder and (2) at least two board members are related either by 
                                                          
6 We rely on the CEO identification in ExecuComp (item CEOANN) to form the sample. Note that, in cases of CEO turnover 
in a given year, the ExecuComp typically identifies the departing CEO as the annual CEO. However, the proxy statement 
reports the replacing one as the company CEO. 
7 Such as, Linkedin, Zoominfo, the website of the company, and etc. 
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blood or marriage.8 Overall, 48.46% of the sample observations are affiliated with founding families, 46.41% 
are managed and owned by outsiders, and 5.13% are affiliated with non-founding families.9 Following, e.g., 
Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, and Cannella (2007), we include non-founding family firms among family-
controlled firms in our sample.10 Among our 1,756 firm-year observations, 546 (31.09%) are of active family 
firms, 395 (22.49%) are of passive family firms, and 815 (46.41%) are of nonfamily firms. 
Measures     
Incentive Pay Our main estimates for incentive pay are two CEO option portfolio sensitivities. We follow Core 
and Guay (2002) and Brockman et al. (2010) to calculate two sensitivity measures. First, the CEO portfolio 
price sensitivity (PRCSEN) is defined as the change in the value of the CEO stock holding and option portfolio 
in response to a 1% change in the firm stock price. Second, the CEO portfolio volatility sensitivity (VOLSEN) is 
defined as the change in the value of the CEO option portfolio in response to a 1% change in stock return 
volatility. Partial derivatives of the option price with respect to stock price (delta δ) and stock return volatility 
(vega v) are based on the Black and Scholes (1973) for valuing European call options, adjusted for dividend 
payouts by Merton (1976).11 This approximation procedure has been commonly adopted in prior works, e.g., 
Knopf , Nam Jr., and Thornton (2002), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), and Coles et al. (2006). 
Long-term Investments and M&A Activities We use capital expenditures, R&D expenses, and M&A activities 
to proxy for long-term corporate investments. Typically, capital expenditures and R&D are considered sources 
for internal growth while M&A deals are viewed as sources for external growth. This motivates us to separate 
the analysis on M&A activities from that on capital expenditures and R&D spending. With regard to 
accounting-wise long-term investments, we collect data from the Compustat database. Capital expenditures and 
R&D expenses are measured as a fraction of total assets, which gives better comparison over time and across 
firms. Many prior studies note that many firms at times fail to report R&D expenses in their accounting 
statements.12 One common method in the empirical research in business is to replace these missing values for 
                                                          
8 Follow Gomez-Mejia et al. (2003), we consider father, mother, sister, brother, son, daughter, spouse, in-laws, aunt, uncle, 
niece, nephew, and cousin. 
9 The percentage of family firms in our sample is higher than that (38.13%) in Anderson et al. (2012). This can be due to 
different sample construction and different definition of family firms. In particular, family presence is more common in 
small firms than in their more established counterparts. But we believe that it does not seriously affect the generality of our 
results as we focus on the comparison between family and non-family firms. 
10 In some cases, we cannot obtain founder information. It is also likely that we lose track of founding family members. 
Thus, we underestimate the true proportion of family firms in the sample. This would potentially work against our testing 
hypotheses. 
11 See, e.g., Brockman et al. (2010) for a detailed description of the computation of the option delta and vega. 
12 For instance, about 42% of public firms in Kob and Reeb (2014), 33.17% in Anderson et al. (2012), or 35.65% in our 
sample.  
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R&D with zeros. We adopt this assumption in our main analysis and employ alternative econometric models to 
address this issue in our sensitivity analyses section.  
In addition, we match our sample observations with M&A data from the SDC US Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. We measure M&A activity by two proxies, the number and the total transaction value of the M&A 
deals made by a firm in a given year. Note that SDC does not report transaction values for a substantial amount 
of M&A deals (approximately 55% in the deals made by our sample firms), especially for those in which the 
target firm is a private firm or a subsidiary of a public firm, and some small deals could go unrecorded in SDC 
(e.g., Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani, 2010). A common method employed in the literature is to assume these 
missing values to be zero, which could seriously underestimate the actual transaction values. To address this 
issue, we use the number of deals as an alternative measure for analysis. 
Control Variables Prior work evinces more interest in the resulting effects of pay incentives than the incentives 
themselves. Generally, these incentives are regarded as exogenous in the analysis. Nevertheless, a number of 
studies view the structure of pay incentives as a choice and thus of research interest in its own right. Earlier, 
delta attracted strong academic interest (e.g., Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles, 1993; Core and Guay, 1999). More 
recent research has shifted the interest to vega itself, or vega and delta simultaneously (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; 
DeYoung et al., 2013). The evidence suggests that, on the one hand, vega is positively related to sales, market-
to-book, firm risk, and CEO cash compensation (Coles et al., 2006). On the other hand, delta is positively 
associated with market-to-book, CEO tenure, and firm risk (Core and Guay, 2002; Coles et al, 2006; DeYoung 
et al., 2013) despite the evidence with regard to the relation between firm risk and delta being mixed (Aggarwal 
and Samwick, 1999). These findings together indicate that delta and vega are determined simultaneously by 
several common factors. We use firm size, Tobin’s Q, CEO age, CEO cash compensation, and CEO duality (as 
a proxy for corporate governance) as five control variables in our analysis. 
There is a tremendous amount of literature on the determinants of corporate investments. Because we aim to 
examine how family firms affect their investment choices, similar to Anderson et al. (2012), we include two sets 
of control variables capturing asset and financing attributes that potentially influence investment policy. First, 
we use the natural logarithm of total sales to control for firm size. We use Tobin’s Q, defined as the market 
value of total assets scaled by the book value of total assets, to control for growth opportunity. We also control 
for life cycle by using the natural logarithm of firm age, which is the difference between the founding year and 
the current year. We collect data on the founding year from various sources such as FundingUniverse.com, 
proxy statements, and company websites. 
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Furthermore, we use four measures to account for the impact of financing constraints. First, we use cash 
holdings over total assets to measure a firm’s liquidity or the ability to provide internal funding for investments. 
Second, we use long-term debt over total assets to measure a firm’s leverage ratio, which indicates its funding 
capacity, both internally and externally. Third, we use total property, plant and equipment over total assets to 
measure asset tangibility, which represents a firm’s ability to obtain external financing because it reduces 
contracting problems (Almeida and Campello, 2007). Finally, we use cash dividends over total assets to control 
for the dividend payout. On the one hand, firms with financial constraints have significantly lower dividend 
payout ratios. On the other hand, all else equal, firms allocating more capital to investments have fewer financial 
resources for dividend payouts. Thus, the relation between investment expenses and dividend payouts is not 
clear, depending on whether the financial constraint or the substitution effect dominates. We also include 
dummy variables for two types of family firms and for industry and year fixed effects in our regression analysis. 
Table A.1 provides a detailed description of the variable definitions and data sources in this paper. 
[Please insert Table A.1 here] 
Empirical Specification 
To estimate the impact that families have on corporate investment decisions as a consequence of their CEO 
pay incentives, we specify the following structural model: 
 
Investment Policy = β1*Pay Incentive + β2*D(Passive Family Firm) + β3*D(Active Family Firm) + 
∑𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(Firm-Specific Control Variables) + e…………………………………………………………………..(1) 
Pay Incentive = γ1*D(Passive Family Firm) + γ2*D(Active Family Firm) + γ3*CEO Duality + γ4*CEO 
Age + γ5*CEO Cash Pay + ∑𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗(Firm-Specific Control Variables) + v…………………………………….(2) 
where D(x) is a dummy variable for variable x. Note that cov(e, v) is allowed to be nonzero, meaning that 
we allow for the possibility that the error terms are correlated across (1) and (2). 
In effect, there are two equations in our model. The first equation (1) is the investment policy equation and 
explains how a certain investment choice is determined. The second equation (2) is the pay incentive equation 
and describes the determinants of pay incentives. By substituting (2) into (1), we can obtain the reduced form 
equation for the model as follows: 
Investment Policy = (β1γ1+β2)*D(Passive Family Firm) + (β1γ2+β3)*D(Active Family Firm) + β1γ3*CEO 
Duality + β1γ4*CEO Age + β1γ5*CEO Cash Pay + ∑(𝛽𝛽1𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)(Firm-Specific Control Variables) + ε….......(3) 
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 It is clear from the reduced form equation (3) that family firm variables can affect investment policy in two 
ways. The first is the direct effect of a particular family firm variable and is captured by β2 or β3, and the second 
is the indirect effect of the same variable via the pay incentive equation and is captured by β1*γ1 or β1*γ2. The 
latter are also called the mediating effects, i.e., the effects that mediate the total effects (see, e.g., Acock, 2013). 
Given a certain type of pay incentive, the total effect of family presence on a certain investment policy is 
β1*γ1+β2 for passive family firms and β1*γ2+β3 for active family firms. To estimate the model, the maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation method is used. As long as the model is correctly specified, ML estimates are 
consistent and efficient. Noted for its flexibility (and potentially better model fit), it can give estimates similar to 
seemingly unrelated regression or simultaneous equation analysis, in addition to other desirable features 
(Tomarken and Waller, 2005).13  
The path diagram in our structural model is displayed in Figure A.1. A path is typically displayed as an 
arrow, drawn from one variable to another, and establishes the relation (causality) between these two variables. 
As exhibited in Figure A.1, there are four sets of linear regressions in the model (i.e., four endogenous variables 
that are jointly determined). Two are related to investment choices (i.e., capital expenditures and R&D 
spending; M&A number and value); in addition, two are for pay incentives (i.e., delta and vega) that are set and 
designed to further affect investment choices as well. We also specify the variables to be correlated (based on 
the correlations between variables as exhibited in Table A.3) and include industry and year dummy variables in 
the two linear regressions of investment choices (not shown in the model path diagram for simplification). 
Standard deviations are clustered on the firm level. 
[Please insert Figure A.1 here] 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table A.1 also provides descriptive statistics for the principal variables of interest in our sample. On the 
whole, the mean (median) level of delta is $299,190 ($132,140), and the level of vega is $49,630 ($30,800). 
These numbers are nearly half of those reported in Coles et al. (2006) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011). A 
possible reason for this is that our sample firms are relatively small, and small firms tend to have smaller 
                                                          
13 We use sem in Stata to generate estimates and test results. Specifically, we adopt the maximum-likelihood-with-missing-
values approach for estimation in which missing values are assumed to be missing at random. When compared to 
simultaneous equation analysis (reg3 in Stata), in addition to some desirable results for the purpose of our study, SEM can 
easily produce robust/clustered variances and incorporate correlated variables.  
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compensation relative to larger establishments. 14  In addition, the mean (median) level of CEO cash 
compensation is $870,040 ($680,550), approximately 75% of the levels in Coles et al. (2006). Our sample has a 
mean (median) ownership of 8.23% (2.5%), which is reduced to 3.5% (0.68%) once stock ownership alone is 
considered. The average CEO is 55 years old. 
Moreover, our sample includes firms with annual total sales of 805.4 million on average and with a median 
of 503.41 million. The return on assets is approximately 8%, and the Q ratio is 1.79 as a whole. In general, firms 
hold cash (12%) and not much debt (16%). An average firm allocates 25% and 1% of its assets to tangible assets 
and cash dividends, respectively. The mean firm age is 47, while some firms’ roots can be traced back to the late 
18th century. On average, the value of capital expenditures and that of the R&D expenses are 5% and 3% of the 
book value of assets, respectively. Firms spend 3% of market capitalization and make 0.59 M&A deals each 
year. There are 8 members on the board of directors, and 52% of firm CEOs are the chairman of the board.   
Table A.2 presents the mean and median tests of the differences in selected CEO- and firm-specific 
characteristics between three types of family firms. Generally speaking, delta is highest in active family firms 
($611,080), while vega is highest ($54,790) in nonfamily firms. Other than pay incentives, we find that CEOs in 
active family firms are older (57) and own much more in equity stakes (20.09% and 9.01% excluding stock 
options). Note that the level of CEO cash compensation is similar across firms with varying degrees of family 
involvement (although the median level is lower in active family firms). With regard to firm-specific 
characteristics, there is no significant difference among the three firm types in terms of operating performance 
and firm size. However, firm age indicates that these three types of family firms represent different stages in the 
life cycle, i.e., family firms tend to be younger and smaller, while nonfamily firms tend to be older and larger. 
Hence, it is not surprising that active family firms have the highest firm risk (and idiosyncratic risk). This also 
suggests that the status of passive family firms is transitory. Overall, family firms have higher growth 
opportunities, hold more cash, issue less debt, and have lower tangible assets. Passive family firms pay the 
highest cash dividends.  
[Please insert Table A.2 here] 
The level of capital expenditures is similar irrespective of family presence. Passive family firms have higher 
R&D expenses and are more prone to M&A deal making. This can be a result of high risk aversion in active 
family firms and the lack of investment opportunity in nonfamily firms. Moreover, active family firms tend to 
                                                          
14 The levels of vega in our sample are similar to those reported in Low (2009) whereas our numbers in terms of both delta 
and vega are significantly higher than those reported in Brockman et al. (2010). 
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be less entrenched, with fewer anti-takeover provisions and a smaller board of directors, which is generally 
viewed as being more effective. However, their CEOs are most likely to serve as chairman of the board. On the 
contrary, CEOs in passive family firms are least likely to serve as the chairman. Finally, the test results indicate 
that although active family firms file fewer patents, they generate a similar amount of citations compared to the 
other two firm types. 
Table A.3 displays the correlations among the key variables of interest. The correlation between capital 
expenditures and R&D is -0.09 (p-value = 0.0001). So, firms investing more in capital expenditure have lower 
R&D expenses. This suggests that, consistent with related literature, these two investments are arguably 
substitutes, but only to a lesser extent (because economically the magnitude of this correlation is relatively low). 
Indeed, our regression results indicate that they do not seem to replace each other. In addition, the correlation 
between M&A number and value is 0.69 (p-value = 0.0000). Hence, firms that are more active in M&A 
activities tend to engage in larger deals. The correlation between delta and vega is 0.35 (p-value = 0.0000). We 
incorporate such a correlated feature into our model, as described in the previous section. 
[Please insert Table A.3 here] 
Primary Findings 
Capital Expenditures and R&D Expenses In this section, we investigate the extent to which incentives from 
CEO compensation packages, in particular the risk-taking incentive vega, mediates the effect of family 
preferences on corporate investment policy (H1a, H1b, and H2). Specifically, we first consider capital 
expenditures and R&D expenses together as investment policy. The latter is typically viewed as being riskier 
with longer investment horizons compared to the former. As hypothesized, we expect that active family firms 
have lower vega and allocate less capital to R&D and more to capital expenditures than do nonfamily firms. A 
lower level of vega indicates a stronger risk aversion preference of families and thus provides a mediating effect 
on that preference. We expect that passive family firms, on the contrary, have higher vega and allocate more 
capital to R&D and less to capital expenditures than do nonfamily firms. A higher level of vega indicates a 
stronger long-horizon preference of families and thus provides a mediating effect on that preference. Table A.4 
reports the estimates of direct effects, indirect effects, and total effects for Models 1 and 2, for which Model 1 
uses a dummy variable called family to capture whether a firm is a family firm and Model 2 uses two dummy 
variables called active family and passive family to capture whether a family firm is run by a family CEO. 
[Please insert Table A.4 here] 
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As displayed in Table A.4, family firms, especially active family firms, devote less capital to R&D projects 
compared to nonfamily firms. In addition, the results of Model 2 reveal that approximately one-third (-0.0032/-
0.01) of the total effect (-1%) is mediated by the incentive pay (the indirect effect of -0.32%).15 These findings 
provide evidence that incentive pay is an important channel whereby families manifest their preference for 
lower risk and greatly mediate the effect of such a preference for risky investment choices. Note that the 
coefficient of the passive family dummy is not statistically significant (the total effect), indicating that there is 
no significant difference in R&D spending between passive family firms and nonfamily firms. That being said, 
this result also indicates that passive family firms engage in R&D more when compared to active family firms.16 
Hence, the family preference for risk aversion seems to give way to a preference for horizons once a family 
CEO is replaced by an outsider. Note that the effect of family firms is not statistically significant, arguably due 
to opposing predictions of active and passive family firms. In contrast to many prior studies, family presence has 
no impact on capital expenditures. After taking into account the control variables for delta and vega, as 
exhibited in the lower part of Table A.4, vega is lowest in active family firms that have the highest delta. Vega 
in passive family firms is lower than nonfamily firms (but higher than active family firms). This is in line with 
the aforementioned interpretation that the risk aversion hypothesis prevails in firms controlled and operated by 
families, but such a preference might be reduced and the family preference for horizons enhances when family 
CEOs are replaced by outside professionals.  
Consistent with the literature, vega induces managerial decisions to invest in risky R&D projects. Higher 
delta results in lower R&D. In terms of the total effect, Tobin’s Q (+) and firm age (-), which capture investment 
opportunities, have the same signs for both types of investments. Firm size decreases and cash holdings increase 
R&D. Leverage has an adverse effect on capital expenditures but not on R&D. Cash dividends lower both 
capital expenditures and R&D, which suggests the substitution effect outweighs the financial constraint effect. 
Asset tangibility is positively associated with capital expenditures, whereas its relation with R&D is negative. 
Overall, we do not find evidence that families prefer to invest in capital expenditures, suggesting that families 
might not consider capital expenditures a low-risk type of investment that can substitute for risky R&D 
investments. Additionally, capital expenditures and R&D share common determinants, which do not always 
                                                          
15 The direct and indirect effects of active family firms on R&D spending are not statistically significant from zero at the 
10% level, although the total effect is. Econometrically, neither the individual component has an effect that is significantly 
different from zero, but the sum is far enough away from zero. Alternatively, we use the bootstrapping approach and obtain 
bootstrapped standard errors. Both direct and indirect effects are statistically significant under this approach.  
16 When using two binary variables for passive family and nonfamily firms, the estimated coefficient of the binary variable 
for passive family firms is positive and statistically significant. The results are not reported and are available upon request. 
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have opposite predictions. Hence, these two types of investments do not necessarily represent alternative 
choices.   
M&A Activities In this section, we focus on M&A activities by examining the number and the value of M&A 
deals. Table A.5 follows the setup of Table A.4 and reports the coefficient estimates. At first glance, as indicated 
in Models 1 and 2, we find that M&A activities are not affected by family presence as a whole. Again, similar to 
the previous section, active family firms and passive family firms seem to behave differently in M&A deal 
making as well. Specifically, passive family firms are more active in M&A and conduct more deals relative to 
nonfamily firms (and active family firms because active family firms and nonfamily firms exhibit similar levels 
of M&A activities). Interestingly, the total effect of passive family firms on the M&A number coincides 
substantially with the direct effect and is not greatly mediated by incentive pay (only -0.01/0.069). If anything, 
this suggests that such incentive pay mitigates, rather than manifests, the family preference for horizons in 
passive family firms. Similarly, these findings are consistent with the aforementioned notion that the family 
risk-aversion preference seems to give way to horizon preference once a family CEO is replaced by an outsider. 
There is no significant difference in M&A deal value among the three firm types. Vega increases both the 
number as well as the value of M&A deals. Delta seems irrelevant in the decision to engage in M&A deals.  
[Please insert Table A.5 here] 
Moreover, in regard to firm-specific attributes, an old firm conducts fewer and smaller M&A deals. With 
respect to financial constraints, a firm with lower cash holdings, tangible assets, and cash dividends as well as 
more leverage has a greater tendency to make (larger) M&A deals. In other words, M&A is associated with less 
availability of (both internal and external sources of) funding, which is inconsistent with the financial constraint 
argument. This therefore suggests that M&A investments are not restricted by funding availability. Because 
internal funds are scarce, many of these deals are likely to be financed by external funding. Tobin’s Q is not 
related to M&A, which might suggest that these deals are not made to take advantage of (internal) growth 
opportunities. Note that the number and the value of M&A deals share common (if not identical) determinants 
that have the same predictions (in terms of signs). This provides supporting evidence that the decision to 
conduct a deal and the evaluation of the deal are determined jointly.  
Overall, as shown in Tables A.4 and A.5, using two family dummies in the regressions rather than adopting 
the conventional two-type categorization would increase the model explanatory power. 
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Pay Incentives and Investment Choices in Family Firms To further examine the relations between family CEO 
incentive pay and investment choices, we produce several figures that help us better understand the family 
preferences. Figure A.2 displays three scatter plots of vega and delta in three types of family firms. Figure A.3 
(4) displays three contour plots of vega, delta, and R&D (the M&A number) for these firms.17 Figure A.2 first 
shows that the joint distribution of vega and delta is more scattered (clustered) in active (passive) family firms 
relative to nonfamily firms. Given a certain level of delta (particularly a higher delta), vega tends to be lower in 
active family firms, which can be due to the risk aversion preference. Vega does not exhibit such a tendency in 
passive family firms, which supports the horizon preference. In Figure A.3, there are a few small areas 
indicating high R&D spending (in colors red and brown) in active family firms, and these “hot zones” appear to 
be larger in passive family firms. The same patterns hold for M&A deal making, as demonstrated in Figure A.4. 
Interestingly, in passive family firms, a higher deal number seems to be associated with a higher vega given a 
certain level of delta. Overall, these figures provide additional evidence supporting family preference for lower 
risk in active family firms and family preference for horizons in passive family firms. Moreover, relative to 
active family firms, vega seems less “pressed” in passive family firms motivated to undertake risk-taking 
projects. 
[Please insert Figures A.2, A.3, and A.4 here] 
Investment Choices and Firm Risk Profile In the spirit of Anderson et al. (2012), we conduct separate tests 
based on the riskiness of firms. If the risk aversion hypothesis dominates, we should observe the negative 
relation between family presence and risky investments more pronounced in firms with higher risk (H3a). 
Alternatively, if the investment horizon hypothesis prevails, families should invest more in risky projects, 
regardless of risk (H3b). The subgroup analysis in this section provides test results for these hypotheses. We use 
the standard deviation of stock returns for the past 60 months as a proxy for underlying firm risk. In addition, 
similar to DeYoung et al. (2013), we estimate market risk and idiosyncratic risk from the Fama-French three-
factor model. We expect that when firms are separated by firm risk, the results would be driven by idiosyncratic 
risk because concentrated shareholdings make families undiversified investors who thus have more exposure to 
idiosyncratic risk.  
We report the direct/indirect/total effects for the variables of primary interest only in Tables A.6 and A.7, 
which replicate the model specifications of Tables A.4 and A.5, respectively. In each table, Panel A displays 
                                                          
17 These contour plots are produced using the thin-plate-spline interpolation method in Stata. 
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separate regression results based on (median) firm risk. Similarly, Panel B (C) displays results based on market 
(idiosyncratic) risk. On the one hand, the results support the risk aversion hypothesis for an average firm with a 
high degree of family involvement. Active family firms prefer fewer risky R&D projects especially when they 
face a riskier business environment. This holds whether the risk is firm risk, market risk, or idiosyncratic risk. 
This therefore suggests that families aim to mitigate any type of risk that their firms have. On the other hand, 
passive family firms devote more resources to R&D compared to active family firms but have a similar level of 
R&D as nonfamily firms when facing a riskier environment (interestingly, the exception is high idiosyncratic 
risk). When facing a lower market risk, these firms have more R&D than the other two types of firms. These 
findings are consistent with the investment horizon hypothesis.  
[Please insert Table A.6 here] 
In general, vega increases R&D investments in low-risk firms and decreases capital expenditures in firms 
with higher idiosyncratic risk. Hence, these results indicate that incentive pay induces (the proper types of) 
investments contingent on the firm’s existing level of riskiness. Furthermore, we find that the results are similar 
to the primary results in Table A.4. Particularly for active family firms, their choices of delta and vega seem to 
be irrespective of the riskiness of firms. Nonetheless, in passive family firms, delta is lowest in the face of lower 
market or idiosyncratic risk. In addition, vega is no longer lower than nonfamily firms in the face of a riskier 
environment. It is possible that in firms with higher risks, vega does not induce risky projects, and thus the need 
for a low vega in firms with a family preference for horizons (i.e., passive family firms) is reduced. Hence, vega 
in such firms is both less negative economically and less significant statistically relative to their low-risk 
counterparts. Note that there are more active family firms in the subgroup of high risk, which potentially 
aggravates their preference for lower risks.18 
In Table A.7, we find that the primary results regarding the M&A activities of families in Table A.5 are 
driven by low-risk firms. Specifically, passive family firms are more active in M&A deal making in firms with 
low firm risk or idiosyncratic risk. Interestingly, delta increases the deal value in firms with low firm risk or 
idiosyncratic risk, whereas vega induces deal activities in firms with high firm risk or idiosyncratic risk. Overall, 
M&A models in the low-risk subgroup have higher explanatory power. Note that the explanatory power in these 
models is generally higher relative to their pooled model in Table A.5. 
[Please insert Table A.7 here] 
                                                          
18 For instance, in our sample, almost 60% of the active family firms are classified as high firm-risk firms, whereas 46% and 
45% of the passive and nonfamily firms, respectively, are classified as high firm-risk firms. 
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Sensitivity Analyses 
In this section, we conduct additional analysis to test the robustness of our primary findings. First, we use 
patent data to address issues concerning missing R&D values. In addition, we use alternative estimation models 
to address potential sample selection issues regarding missing R&D values and endogeneity issues regarding 
family involvement. 
R&D Outcomes and Patents Filed/Cited Our primary results indicate that CEO incentive pay mediates the 
relations between family involvement and investment choices. More specifically, family CEO incentive pay 
manifests the family preference for lower risk in active family firms that have lower R&D spending. We also 
find evidence for family preference for longer investment horizons in passive family firms that increase 
investments in R&D and M&A deals. In this section, we investigate the relations between families and R&D 
outcomes.  
The main reason that we examine R&D outcomes is because a significant amount of our sample 
observations have missing R&D values. As mentioned previously, a common approach adopted in the business 
literature is to assign zero values to these missing values. However, there is growing evidence suggesting that it 
is a firm’s choice not to report R&D expenses. As a result, using this approach in the analysis might 
underestimate the true R&D efforts for these firms. The existing literature argues that R&D expenses serve as an 
input that feeds the innovative process in which patents are one potential output. Arguably, the number of 
patents would proxy for R&D outcomes. However, it is not necessarily a good proxy for innovative efforts 
because of the large variance in value and the lack of incorporating influence of the individual patents (Hall et 
al., 2005). Hence, the number of patent citations is considered a better proxy for the value of R&D efforts. We 
use both proxies in our analysis. 
Following Anderson et al. (2012), we collect patent and patent citation data from Bronwyn Hall’s database.19 
We calculate the number of citations for each patent and the number of patents filed for each firm-year 
observation (and thus the sum of citations generated from these patents) based on the Compustat firm-level 
identification number (i.e., permno). We then match these two constructs to our sample. Table A.8 Panel A 
provides statistics for patents filed and citations for three subgroups, those with missing R&D, with zero R&D, 
and with positive R&D. We observe that both patent number and patent citation seem to be higher in the 
missing R&D group than in the zero R&D group. This suggests that assuming no R&D in firms that do not 
                                                          
19 See Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, and Stoffman (2012) for a detailed description of the data matching procedure, which is 
an ongoing project.  
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report R&D expenses underestimates the true value of their R&D efforts. Nevertheless, we notice that these 
numbers are much lower than those in the positive R&D group. Therefore, replacing missing values with zeros 
might not seriously bias our results.  
[Please insert Table A.8 here] 
Moreover, from Table A.8 Panel B, we find that the mix of family firms seems similar across different R&D 
subgroups. Thus, it appears that family presence does not play a role in R&D reporting practices. We find that in 
the positive R&D group, passive family firms have the highest number of patents filed as well as of patent 
citations, which lends support for the horizon hypothesis. Interestingly, active family firms have the fewest 
patents filed, but they have slightly more citations (or at least a similar number of citations) relative to 
nonfamily firms. This suggests that despite a family preference for lower risk that leads to fewer patents, these 
patents filed by active family firms are more influential. In the missing R&D group, nonfamily firms have the 
greatest active patent activity compared to the other two firm types. Consequently, these firms would be more 
prone to biases resulting from assigning zeros to missing values. Finally, we use these two constructs as 
dependent variables and conduct similar structural analysis. As exhibited in Table A.8 Panel C, there is no 
strong evidence for either hypothesis after controlling for a set of likely determinants.  
Alternative Estimation Models In this section, we aim to address issues arising from missing R&D values by 
employing alternative econometric models. In the spirit of Anderson et al. (2012), we first use a Tobit model 
that addresses censored data. Because the missing values for R&D are assigned the value zero, there is a large 
cluster of zero observations in our sample. Tobit regressions are appropriate for empirical analysis with such 
censored data. Nevertheless, unreported R&D values can the result of firm choices. The level of R&D and the 
likelihood of the data being reported are likely jointly determined. That is, the occurrence of these missing 
values is endogenous (Anderson et al., 2012). To address such a sample selection issue, we use a Heckman 
model for testing.  
Table A.9 reports the coefficient estimates for these two model regressions (Models 1-3 for the Tobit and 
Models 4-6 for the Heckman regressions). In these models, we use interaction terms between vega and family 
involvement (the binary variables or continuous variables that capture executive ownership) to examine how 
family presence affects R&D through incentive pay, apart from the effects of these incentives themselves.20 We 
                                                          
20 For the purpose of our study, we should also include the standalone family variables in the regressions. But, due to very 
high correlations between these family variables and their interaction terms (with vega), we include the interaction terms 
only. Hence, their coefficient estimates represent total effects as in our model specification that proxy for family preference 
without being able to identify indirect (mediating) effects through incentive pay. 
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also include all control variables (and the industry and year fixed effects) used in our main analysis of R&D (as 
in Table A.4). Generally speaking, delta decreases and vega increases capital input for risky R&D investments, 
consistent with our previous results. However, we do not find that R&D efforts are discouraged in (active) 
family firms, which is inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis found in our previous analysis. 
Intriguingly, passive family firms invest more in R&D, compared with nonfamily firms, which is effectively 
consistent with the investment horizon hypothesis. The estimates of the control variables are qualitatively 
similar to Table A.4. Overall, our main results still hold with these alternative model choices, although these 
models suggest a stronger family preference for horizons than for lower risk. 
[Please insert Table A.9 here] 
One of the primary and typical issues concerns endogeneity. That is, family presence or ownership is not 
random and is thus determined by investment policy itself or some unobservable factors (and can be common 
with factors that determine investment policy). This notion has been supported by a number of empirical 
studies.21 To address such concerns and examine causal relations between family firms and their investment 
choices, following Anderson et al. (2012), we employ an instrumental variable two-stage Tobit model that 
allows for endogenous variables. We use CEO duality as the instrument for the two family variables. Similarly, 
we use interaction terms to examine the influence of families, again with a set of control variables as well as 
industry and time fixed effects. The results are reported in Table A.9 (Models 7-10). Again, vega itself increases 
R&D, which is reduced (through incentive pay) in active family firms. The level of R&D is higher (through 
incentive pay) in passive family firms. These results further indicate that after controlling for endogeneity, the 
risk aversion hypothesis dominates in active family firms, while the investment horizon hypothesis dominates in 
passive family firms. 
Discussion and Implications 
Our paper studies two hypotheses of family preferences on investment decisions. We focus on one pay 
incentive vega that motivates the decision to allocate capital to risky investments in family firms. This is one 
main innovative element of our study. To further our understanding, here we re-examine the relations between 
family presence/ownership and vega. Because of the risk aversion preference, concentrated ownership is 
hypothesized as being associated with low vega. Nevertheless, we expect firm age to be critical in vega, 
                                                          
21 See, for instance, Pindado, Requejo, and de la Torre (2012). 
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conditional on ownership. For instance, an old firm typically faces scarce growth opportunities and might need a 
higher level of vega to induce managerial efforts for long-term and risky investments that ensure firm 
prosperity. Figure A.5 displays three contour plots of firm age, executive (family) ownership, and vega in three 
types of family firms. These plots provide evidence for our conjecture. For each firm type, there are areas of 
high vega (in colors red and yellow) located on the middle-right side of the plot. Hence, high vega (together 
with substantial ownership) is provided by some old firms, although less so in active family firms, which 
suggests the risk aversion hypothesis. Interestingly, for active family firms, there is one area of high vega (in 
red) located on the bottom-left side of the plot. This indicates that high vega is provided by some young active 
family firms, which supports the horizon hypothesis.  
[Please insert Figure A.5 here] 
We also find that the relation between firm age and ownership is positive (slightly concave) for active family 
firms, although there seems to be no linear relation for passive and nonfamily firms. 22 This suggests that 
ownership accumulates over time for family CEOs only. Thus, for active family firms, in the early stage of 
business, delta is not very high because of (relatively) lower ownership, but vega can be very high due to risk 
seeking preferences (e.g., entrepreneurship). As firms age and begin to lack growth opportunities, vega can be 
high to motivate CEOs to engage in long-term investments. However, there are fewer such cases in active 
family firms because of family preference for lower risk. 
Conclusion 
Anderson et al. (2012) postulate that family preferences for risk and horizons potentially affect investment 
decisions that might not be in the best interest of nonfamily stakeholders. The authors offer evidence that 
families prefer to allocate financial resources to capital expenditures relative to risky R&D investments and 
argue that this is because the risk aversion of these families outweighs the longer investment horizon of their 
long-term commitment. Another line of research on family firms indicates that these firms have different CEO 
pay structures compared with their nonfamily counterparts. Because pay incentives are likely to induce 
managerial behavior that enhances firm performance and investment decisions are value-critical observable 
decisions that CEOs make, it is plausible that families influence investment policy through pay incentives, in 
                                                          
22 Relevant plots are not provided due to limited space and are available upon request. 
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particular option vega. We hypothesize that CEO incentive pay mediates family preferences for lower risk and 
long horizons, which leads to different investment choices in firms with varying degrees of family involvement. 
With a sample of 362 small U.S. publicly-traded companies from 2001 to 2005, we adopt a mediation model 
under a structural framework and find that active family firms have the lowest vega and the highest delta. Such 
incentive pay mediates approximately one-third of the underinvestment in risky R&D projects, especially for 
high-risk firms. Therefore, CEO incentive pay manifests the family preference for low risk in active family 
firms. Our results also demonstrate that passive family firms have higher R&D compared to active family firms 
and conduct more M&A deals, especially in low-risk firms. Hence, there is evidence for the family preference 
for horizons in passive family firms, but CEO incentive pay seems to mitigate, rather than manifest, such a 
preference. In our analysis, capital expenditures, usually viewed as less risky with a short-term feature, are not 
affected by family presence. This suggests that capital expenditure and R&D may not necessarily be substitutes.  
One main innovative aspect of our paper is that we connect seemingly unrelated strands of literature and 
identify one key channel that affects and/or manifests family preferences for investment choices. In general, our 
findings are in line with the earlier studies. For instance, consistent with Anderson et al. (2012), the finding that 
R&D spending is the lowest in active family firms supports the family preference for lower firm risk. Moreover, 
we find a positive association between vega and R&D. This piece of evidence suggests that higher vega induces 
risk-seeking managerial behavior, resulting in more riskier investments, which is consistent with the literature 
on option vega (e.g., Nam et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2006; DeYoung et al., 2013). Furthermore, similar to Li, 
Ryan, and Wang (2012), we show that vega is lower in family firms. Altogether, we add to the literature and 
demonstrate that CEO incentive pay affects investment decisions in family firms. 
Overall, our paper provides evidence that CEO incentive pay is one important mechanism that influences 
corporate investment policy in family firms. Using CEO family affiliation and family ownership to identify 
family firms helps us test both the risk aversion and the investment horizon hypotheses in a more accurate 
manner. Our analysis suggests that the family preference to mitigate risk dominates in firms with a high degree 
of family involvement and that such a preference gives way to a horizon preference when family involvement is 
reduced. These patterns affect managerial compensation structure. One important implication for nonfamily 
shareholders in active family firms is that moderating incentive pay is one effective way to address issues of 
R&D underinvestment. Nevertheless, higher R&D in passive family firms with high idiosyncratic risk might not 
be a serious concern for nonfamily shareholders because this type of risk can be diversified away. Last but not 
least, our tests indicate that firms owned and run by families are considerably different from others, indicating 
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that replacing a family member CEO with an outsider initiates the transition to a nonfamily firm. This also 
indicates that to avoid spurious relations, the classification of family firms should consider not only the 
ownership but also the control of the firm. 
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Table A.1 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics on CEO and firm characteristics 
Variable Definition Data Source Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
CEO-specific:        
Delta* ($M) The change in the value of the CEO’s 
stock holding and option portfolio in 
response to a 1% change in the firm’s 
stock price 
Calculation following Core and Guay (2002) and Brockman 
et al. (2010) with data from ExecuComp 
299.19 132.14 582.82 8,277.63 0.00 
Vega* ($M) The change in the value of the CEO’s 
option portfolio in response to a 1% 
change in stock return volatility 
Calculation following Core and Guay (2002) and Brockman 
et al. (2010) with data from ExecuComp 
49.63 30.80 63.78 730.75 0.00 
Cash compensation* 
($M) 
The sum of the CEO‟s salary and bonus ExecuComp item total_curr 870.04 680.55 920.19 21,119.34 0.00 
Ownership* (%) Percentage of CEO shareholding, 
including the holdings of family 
members, if applicable 
Proxy statements 8.23 2.50 14.47 81.20 0.00 
Share ownership (%) Percentage of executive shareholding 
(excluding options) 
ExecuComp item shrown_excl_opts scaled by Compustat 
item shrsout 
3.50 0.68 7.59 62.76 0.00 
Executive age* Age of the CEO ExecuComp item age 55.48 55.00 7.71 84.00 29.00 
        
Firm-specific:        
Firm size* ($MM) Annual total sales Compustat item sale 805.40 503.41 1,004.71 10,973.32 0.00 
Firm age* Difference between the founding year 
and the data year 
Online sources (e.g., www.funduniverse.com) 47.35 36.00 35.01 230.00 0.00 
Cash ratio Cash scaled by total assets  Compustat item ch/at 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.78 0.00 
Leverage ratio Year-end long-term debt scaled by total 
assets 
Compustat items dltt/at 0.16 0.12 0.16 1.62 0.00 
Asset tangibility ratio Total property, plant and equipment 
scaled by total assets  
Compustat item ppent/at 0.25 0.19 0.20 0.96 0.00 
Dividend ratio Firm’s annual cash dividends scaled by 
total assets 
Compustat item dv/at 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.45 0.00 
Firm risk Standard deviation volatility over the 
past 60 months 
Compustat item bs_volatility 0.55 0.51 0.21 1.53 0.18 
Market risk (%) Beta coefficient estimated from the three-
factor market model over a year 
CRSP item retx and factors data on Kenneth R. French’s 
website 
1.13 1.09 0.52 5.90 -6.81 
Idiosyncratic risk 
(%) 
Standard deviation of the three-factor 
market model residuals over a year 
CRSP item retx and factors data on Kenneth R. French’s 
website 
2.92 2.61 1.35 14.77 0.96 
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Return on assets A ratio of earnings before interest and tax 
scaled by total assets 
Compustat items ebit/at 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.66 -1.65 
Tobin’s Q+ Market-to-book ratio, defined as total 
assets plus the market value of common 
stock less the sum of book value of 
common equity and balance sheet 
deferred taxes scaled by total assets 
Compustat items (at+csho*(prcc_f-bkvlps)-txdb)/at 1.79 1.46 1.07 11.13 0.40 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by total 
assets 
Compsutat items capx/at 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.82 0.00 
R&D R&D expenditures scaled by total assets Compsutat items xrd/at 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.40 0.00 
M&A number* Firm’s number of M&A deals Security Data Corporation 0.59 0.00 1.05 9.00 0.00 
M&A value Sum of the M&A deal value scaled by 
the firm’s market value of equity 
Security Data Corporation 0.03 0.00 0.12 2.43 0.00 
GIM index Follows Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003) 
RiskMetrics Governance Legacy item gindex 8.76 9.00 2.63 17.00 2.00 
Entrenchment index Follows Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 
(2004) 
RiskMetrics Governance Legacy items 
cboard+supermajor+ppill+goldenparachute+lachtr+labylw 
2.20 2.00 1.29 5.00 0.00 
Board size Number of directors on the board RiskMetrics Directors Directors Legacy 7.89 8.00 1.94 15.00 1.00 
CEO duality (0/1) Binary variable that equals one when the 
CEO serves as company chairman 
ExecuComp item titleann 0.52 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 
Patent number* The number of patents filed over a year Bronwyn Hall’s patent database 2.38 0.00 6.31 83.00 0.00 
Patent citation* The number of citations of filed patents 
over a year 
Bronwyn Hall’s patent database 16.29 0.00 68.40 1,511.00 0.00 
From Table A.3 onwards, the variables with symbols * and + are scaled by natural logarithm and are winsorized at the top 1% level, respectively.   
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Table A.2 
Comparisons of selected characteristics among firm types 
Variable Active Family Firms 
Passive Family 
Firms 
Non Family 
Firms 
p-Value of Test for Diff. in 
Means (Distribution) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  II－I III－II III－I 
CEO-specific:          
Delta ($M) 611.08 310.82 144.01 98.70 165.46 92.16 0 0.0992 0 
             (0) (0.1994) (0) 
Vega ($M) 47.41 25.06 42.06 30.30 54.79 36.32 0.2047 0.0003 0.0531 
             (0.0201) (0.0007) (0) 
Cash compensation  897.96 611.33 842.08 693.90 864.88 700.00 0.4416 0.5745 0.542 
($M)             (0.0031) (0.2488) (0) 
Ownership (%) 20.09 12.27 2.57 1.50 3.04 1.80 0 0.201 0 
             (0) (0.0001) (0) 
Share ownership (%) 9.01 4.61 1.13 0.33 0.96 0.39 0 0.2854 0 
             (0) (0.113) (0) 
Executive age 56.88 58.00 54.45 54.00 55.04 55.00 0 0.1671 0 
             (0) (0.0945) (0) 
Firm-specific:                   
Firm size ($MM) 838.50 417.68 806.23 533.21 782.83 546.80 0.6749 0.6359 0.3355 
             (0.0027) (0.963) (0.0003) 
Firm age 38.03 30.00 47.79 38.00 53.39 44.00 0 0.0143 0 
             (0.0001) (0.0157) (0) 
Cash ratio 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.0901 0.4714 0.0057 
             (0.303) (0.082) (0.0036) 
Leverage ratio 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.9454 0.0031 0.0019 
             (0.5201) (0.0005) (0) 
Asset tangibility ratio 0.23 0.17 0.24 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.2962 0.0491 0.0005 
             (0.3042) (0.0106) (0.0001) 
Dividend ratio 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.0017 0.0083 0.6484 
             (0) (0) (0.1565) 
Firm risk 0.59 0.57 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.48 0 0.9099 0 
             (0) (0.8458) (0) 
Market risk (%) 1.16 1.13 1.13 1.08 1.10 1.06 0.4947 0.349 0.0967 
             (0.4525) (0.1732) (0.0314) 
Idiosyncratic risk (%) 3.16 2.82 2.89 2.49 2.77 2.48 0.0076 0.1798 0 
             (0.0003) (0.5641) (0) 
Return on assets 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.6283 0.7569 0.7838 
             (0.9407) (0.4473) (0.4808) 
Tobin’s Q 1.83 1.54 1.89 1.49 1.70 1.41 0.3717 0.0038 0.0275 
             (0.8065) (0.0033) (0.0046) 
CAPEX 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.6234 0.9704 0.4953 
             (0.842) (0.3457) (0.4025) 
R&D 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.0354 0.0573 0.7945 
             (0.0617) (0.0269) (0.7375) 
M&A number 0.58 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.1148 0.0154 0.535 
             (0.0195) (0.0255) (0.6795) 
M&A value 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.0621 0.6033 0.0204 
             (0.0393) (0.2522) (0.2716) 
GIM index 7.99 8.00 8.94 9.00 9.17 9.00 0 0.2412 0 
             (0) (0.3927) (0) 
Entrenchment index 1.73 2.00 2.17 2.00 2.53 3.00 0 0.0001 0 
             (0) (0.0003) (0) 
Board size 7.56 7.00 8.38 8.00 7.87 8.00 0 0.0001 0.0104 
             (0) (0.0008) (0.0006) 
CEO duality (0/1) 0.68 1.00 0.34 0.00 0.50 1.00 0 0 0 
             (0) (0) (0) 
Patent number 1.91 0.00 2.86 0.00 2.47 0.00 0.013 0.3572 0.0965 
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             (0.1231) (0.3891) (0.3733) 
Patent citation 15.18 0.00 19.64 0.00 15.42 0.00 0.3837 0.3186 0.9436 
             (0.0896) (0.4728) (0.2213) 
# of obs. 546 395 815    
See Table A.1 for variable definitions.  
This table presents means and medians of variables in Table A.1 with respect to three subgroups of our sample 
firms. Type I firm is active founding-family firm, i.e., controlled and run by founding family; Type II firm is 
passive founding-family firm, i.e., controlled but not run by founding family; Type III firm is non-founding-
family firm, i.e., neither controlled nor run by founding family. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1 
Simple illustration of baseline structural equation model 
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A path is typically shown as an arrow, drawn from one variable to another, and establishes the relation 
(causality) between these two variables.
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Table A.3 
Correlation matrix of key variables
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 CAPEX 1                
2 R&D -0.09* 1               
3 M&A number -0.11* 0.01 1              
4 M&A value -0.09* 0.05 0.69* 1             
5 Delta 0.07* -0.06 0.04 0.02 1            
6 Vega -0.05 0.00 0.11* 0.09* 0.35* 1           
7 Firm size -0.03 -0.53* 0.07* 0.04 0.12* 0.17* 1          
8 Tobin’s Q 0.12* 0.31* -0.02 -0.04 0.27* 0.06* -0.34* 1         
9 Firm age -0.10* -0.26* -0.05 -0.04 -0.12* 0.03 0.37* -0.27* 1        
10 Cash ratio -0.07* 0.39* -0.09* -0.07* 0.07* -0.04 -0.43* 0.37* -0.25* 1       
11 Leverage ratio 0.03 -0.22* 0.07* 0.11* -0.11* 0.07* 0.32* -0.27* 0.19* -0.35* 1      
12 Asset tangibility 0.57* -0.29* -0.14* -0.09* -0.02 -0.07* 0.13* -0.13* 0.10* -0.29* 0.28* 1     
13 Dividend ratio -0.06 -0.08* -0.07* -0.06 -0.08* -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.16* -0.07* -0.06 -0.02 1    
14 CEO duality 0.03 -0.14* 0.00 -0.02 0.21* 0.09* 0.12* -0.05 0.10* -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.03 1   
15 CEO age -0.06 -0.10* -0.05 -0.04 0.11* -0.10* 0.10* -0.14* 0.22* -0.14* 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.20* 1  
16 Cash pay -0.07* -0.18* 0.07* 0.08* 0.14* 0.27* 0.42* -0.05 0.17* -0.08* 0.15* 0.02 0.03 0.12* 0.04 1 
See Table A.1 for variable definitions. The symbols * represents statistical significance at the 0.01 level. 
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Table A.4 
Family firms, CEO option sensitivities, and corporate investments 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D 
Family 0.0044 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0033** 0.0044 -0.0037       
 (1.38) (-0.09) (0.001)  (-2.34) (1.29) (-0.85)       
Active family       0.0060 -0.0068 -0.0004 -0.0032 0.0056 -0.0100* 
       (1.24) (-1.2) (-0.2) (-1.31) (1.16) (-1.96) 
Passive family       0.0030 0.0050 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0028 0.0046 
       (0.92) (0.88) (-0.77) (-0.86) (0.86) (0.82) 
Delta 0.001 -0.004**   0.001 -0.004** 0.000 -0.002   0.000 -0.002 
 (0.36) (-2)   (0.36) (-2) (0.06) (-1.01)   (0.06) (-1.01) 
Vega 0.001 0.003**   0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.002   0.001 0.002 
 (0.61) (2.2)   (0.61) (2.2) (0.84) (1.6)   (0.84) (1.6) 
Firm size -0.001 -0.019*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.020*** -0.001 -0.020*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.020*** 
 (-0.79) (-6.11) (0.67) (-0.95) (-0.68) (-6.35) (-0.7) (-6.4) (0.35) (-0.4) (-0.65) (-6.55) 
Tobin’s Q 0.007*** 0.007** 0.000 -0.001 0.008*** 0.006* 0.008*** 0.006* 0.000 -0.000 0.008*** 0.006* 
 (3.93) (2.21) (0.55) (-1.55) (4.59) (1.95) (4.17) (1.96) (0.26) (-0.64) (4.63) (1.91) 
Firm age -0.005* -0.006   -0.005* -0.006 -0.004* -0.006*   -0.004* -0.006* 
 (-1.81) (-1.62)   (-1.81) (-1.62) (-1.75) (-1.69)   (-1.75) (-1.69) 
Cash ratio 0.000 0.054**   0.000 0.054** 0.000 0.054**   0.000 0.054** 
 (0.03) (2.38)   (0.03) (2.38) (0.03) (2.42)   (0.03) (2.42) 
Leverage ratio -0.026*** 0.001   -0.026*** 0.001 -0.026*** 0.004   -0.026*** 0.004 
 (-3.01) (0.09)   (-3.01) (0.09) (-2.96) (0.23)   (-2.96) (0.23) 
Asset tangibility 0.158*** -0.040***   0.158*** -0.040*** 0.158*** -0.041***   0.158*** -0.041*** 
 (5.97) (-4.05)   (5.97) (-4.05) (5.92) (-4.16)   (5.92) (-4.16) 
Dividend ratio -0.069* -0.203**   -0.069* -0.203** -0.068* -0.208**   -0.068* -0.208** 
 (-1.69) (-1.98)   (-1.69) (-1.98) (-1.66) (-1.97)   (-1.66) (-1.97) 
CEO duality   0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
   (0.65) (-1.04) (0.65) (-1.04)   (0.7) (0.5) (0.7) (0.5) 
CEO age   -0.000 -0.007** -0.000 -0.007**   -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 
   (-0.13) (-2.26) (-0.13) (-2.26)   (-0.5) (-1.61) (-0.5) (-1.61) 
Cash pay   0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001   0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
   (0.76) (1.46) (0.76) (1.46)   (0.89) (1.28) (0.89) (1.28) 
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Equation-level R2     0.4142 0.3928     0.4151 0.3954 
             
 Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega 
Family 0.545*** -0.430***   0.545*** -0.430***       
 (5.54) (-4.23)   (5.54) (-4.23)       
Active family       1.088*** -0.534***   1.088*** -0.534*** 
       (9.71) (-4)   (9.71) (-4) 
Passive family       -0.177 -0.292**   -0.177 -0.292** 
       (-1.58) (-2.47)   (-1.58) (-2.47) 
Firm size 0.240*** 0.141**   0.240*** 0.141** 0.278*** 0.134**   0.278*** 0.134** 
 (5) (2.48)   (5) (2.48) (6.35) (2.39)   (6.35) (2.39) 
Tobin’s Q 0.467*** 0.157***   0.467*** 0.157*** 0.480*** 0.155***   0.480*** 0.155*** 
 (9.47) (3.26)   (9.47) (3.26) (10.23) (3.19)   (10.23) (3.19) 
CEO duality 0.467*** 0.242**   0.467*** 0.242** 0.242*** 0.285***   0.242*** 0.285*** 
 (4.72) (2.27)   (4.72) (2.27) (2.62) (2.67)   (2.62) (2.67) 
CEO age 0.872** -1.110***   0.872** -1.110*** 0.659* -1.070***   0.659* -1.070*** 
 (2.3) (-2.79)   (2.3) (-2.79) (1.94) (-2.67)   (1.94) (-2.67) 
Cash pay 0.082 0.366***   0.082 0.366*** 0.101 0.363***   0.101 0.363*** 
 (1.06) (2.88)   (1.06) (2.88) (1.31) (2.89)   (1.31) (2.89) 
             
Equation-level R2     0.2209 0.1314     0.3328 0.1353 
             
Industry and Year F.E.   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.7548   0.7929 
# of obs.      1,756      1,756 
See Table A.1 for variable definitions. 
This table reports structural equation model estimates of corporate investments (measured as the two ratios of capital expenditure and R&D spending to total assets, 
respectively). The sample consists of 1,756 firm-year observations that represent 362 unique US small firms during the period of 2001-2005. Active family firm is controlled 
and run by founding family. Passive family firm is controlled but not run by founding family. Family firm consists of both active and passive family firms. Z-Values are in 
parentheses and are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering on the firm-level identifier. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical 
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A.5 
Family firms, CEO option sensitivities, and M&A activities 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value 
Family 0.036 0.003 -0.013 -0.022 0.023 -0.020       
 (0.99) (0.03) (-1.25) (-0.92) (0.72) (-0.2)       
Active family       -0.016 -0.190 0.004 0.050 -0.011 -0.140 
       (-0.34) (-1.52) (0.22) (1.01) (-0.31) (-1.35) 
Passive family       0.079* 0.166 -0.010* -0.025 0.069* 0.140 
       (1.92) (1.31) (-1.75) (-1.54) (1.69) (1.11) 
Delta 0.001 0.014   0.001 0.014 0.016 0.068*   0.016 0.068* 
 (0.1) (0.43)   (0.1) (0.43) (1.16) (1.84)   (1.16) (1.84) 
Vega 0.031*** 0.070**   0.031*** 0.070** 0.024** 0.045   0.024** 0.045 
 (2.73) (2.19)   (2.73) (2.19) (2.03) (1.35)   (2.03) (1.35) 
Firm size 0.030 0.023 0.005 0.013 0.035* 0.037 0.026 0.007 0.008** 0.025** 0.033* 0.032 
 (1.56) (0.46) (1.36) (1.34) (1.87) (0.74) (1.36) (0.14) (2.01) (2.21) (1.81) (0.65) 
Tobin’s Q 0.003 -0.030 0.005 0.018 0.008 -0.012 -0.004 -0.055 0.011* 0.040** 0.007 -0.015 
 (0.19) (-0.66) (0.94) (1.07) (0.6) (-0.28) (-0.26) (-1.18) (1.83) (2.17) (0.54) (-0.35) 
Firm age -0.048* -0.166**   -0.048* -0.166** -0.050* -0.175**   -0.050* -0.175** 
 (-1.74) (-2.09)   (-1.74) (-2.09) (-1.84) (-2.2)   (-1.84) (-2.2) 
Cash ratio -0.499*** -1.013***   -0.499*** -1.013*** -0.499*** -1.013***   -0.499*** -1.013*** 
 (-4.15) (-2.85)   (-4.15) (-2.85) (-4.15) (-2.86)   (-4.15) (-2.86) 
Leverage ratio 0.215** 1.235***   0.215** 1.235*** 0.232** 1.300***   0.232** 1.300*** 
 (2.09) (3.57)   (2.09) (3.57) (2.29) (3.82)   (2.29) (3.82) 
Asset tangibility -0.435*** -1.191***   -0.435*** -1.191*** -0.445*** -1.229***   -0.445*** -1.229*** 
 (-3.75) (-3.88)   (-3.75) (-3.88) (-3.79) (-4.06)   (-3.79) (-4.06) 
Dividend ratio -1.413*** -3.635***   -1.413*** -3.635*** -1.451*** -3.777***   -1.451*** -3.777*** 
 (-4.02) (-3.37)   (-4.02) (-3.37) (-4.07) (-3.47)   (-4.07) (-3.47) 
CEO duality   0.008 0.023 0.008 0.023   0.011** 0.029** 0.011** 0.029** 
   (1.23) (1.29) (1.23) (1.29)   (2.19) (2.04) (2.19) (2.04) 
CEO age   -0.033 -0.065 -0.033 -0.065   -0.016 -0.004 -0.016 -0.004 
   (-1.44) (-1.23) (-1.44) (-1.23)   (-0.71) (-0.07) (-0.71) (-0.07) 
Cash pay   0.011** 0.027* 0.011** 0.027*   0.010* 0.023 0.010* 0.023 
   (2.02) (1.72) (2.02) (1.72)   (1.83) (1.47) (1.83) (1.47) 
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Equation-level R2     0.0755 0.0453     0.0790 0.0508 
             
Industry and Year F.E.   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.3793   0.4756 
# of obs.      1,756      1,756 
See Table A.1 for variable definitions. 
This table reports structural equation model estimates of M&A activities. M&A activities are measured as ln(1+M&A number) and ln(1+ sum of M&A deal value), 
respectively. The sample consists of 1,756 firm-year observations that represent 362 unique US small firms during the period of 2001-2005. Active family firm is controlled 
and run by founding family. Passive family firm is controlled but not run by founding family. Family firm consists of both active and passive family firms. Z-Values are in 
parentheses and are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering on the firm-level identifier. All specifications control for industry (1-digit SIC codes) 
and year fixed effects. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Figure A.2 Scatter plots of vega and delta in three types of family firms 
 
   
Figure A.3 Contour plots of vega, delta, and R&D in three types of family firms 
  
   
Figure A.4 Contour plots of vega, delta, and M&A number in three types of family firms 
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Table A.6 
Family firms, CEO option sensitivities, and corporate investments (contingent on risks) 
Panel A: firm risk 
 Low (below median risk) High (above median risk) 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D 
Active family 0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.013 -0.005* -0.002 0.002 -0.015* 
 (0.45) (-0.48) (1.43) (-0.52) (0.83) (-0.93) (1.33) (-1.46) (-1.89) (-0.48) (0.38) (-1.88) 
Passive family 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.004  -0.000 0.009  0.000  0.000  -0.000 0.009 
 (1) (0.9) (-0.79) (-1.59) (0.85) (0.73) (-0.05) (0.89) (0.27) (0.41) (-0.03) (0.91) 
Delta 0.003  0.000     0.003  0.000 -0.004* -0.002     -0.004* -0.002 
 (1.58) (0.18)     (1.58) (0.18) (-1.81) (-0.56)     (-1.81) (-0.56) 
Vega  -0.000 0.003      -0.000 0.003 0.002  -0.000     0.002  -0.000 
 (-0.13) (1.55)     (-0.13) (1.55) (0.92) (-0.13)     (0.92) (-0.13) 
Equation-level R2     0.4103 0.2783     0.5167 0.4037 
             
 Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega 
Active family 0.981*** -0.550***     0.981*** -0.550*** 1.094*** -0.367***     1.094*** -0.367*** 
 (5.67) (-2.95)     (5.67) (-2.95) (8.76) (-2.61)     (8.76) (-2.61) 
Passive family -0.233 -0.333**     -0.233 -0.333** -0.090 -0.164     -0.090 -0.164 
 (-1.59) (-2.28)     (-1.59) (-2.28) (-0.78) (-1.26)     (-0.78) (-1.26) 
Equation-level R2     0.3168 0.2433     0.4308 0.0871 
Industry and Year F.E.       
& control variables   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.7749   0.8463 
# of obs.      839      838 
 
Panel B: market risk 
 Low (below median risk) High (above median risk) 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D 
Active family 0.001 -0.001  0.000 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.009* -0.013 -0.002 -0.001 0.007* -0.014* 
 (0.23) (-0.18) (0.16) (-1.62) (0.32) (-1.05) (1.74) (-1.54) (-0.81) (-0.34) (1.82) (-1.9) 
Passive family 0.011** 0.011* -0.001 -0.001 0.010** 0.009* 0.002 0.009  -0.000  -0.000 0.002 0.009 
 (2.23) (1.84) (-0.95) (-0.97) (2.1) (1.66) (0.57) (0.91) (-0.75) (-0.15) (0.51) (0.91) 
Delta 0.001 -0.003     0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001     -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.51) (-1.19)     (0.51) (-1.19) (-0.47) (-0.28)     (-0.47) (-0.28) 
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Vega 0.001 0.005**     0.001 0.005** 0.002 0.001     0.002 0.001 
 (0.96) (2.5)     (0.96) (2.5) (1.24) (0.35)     (1.24) (0.35) 
Equation-level R2     0.5458 0.3904     0.4910 0.4257 
             
 Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega 
Active family 0.911*** -0.512**     0.911*** -0.512** 1.197*** -0.468***     1.197*** -0.468*** 
 (5.11) (-2.52)     (5.11) (-2.52) (8.4) (-2.62)     (8.4) (-2.62) 
Passive family -0.384** -0.486***     -0.384** -0.486*** -0.101 -0.153     -0.101 -0.153 
 (-2.12) (-2.77)     (-2.12) (-2.77) (-0.84) (-1.1)     (-0.84) (-1.1) 
Equation-level R2     0.3257 0.1890     0.3629 0.1038 
Industry and Year F.E.       
& control variables   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.8455   0.8275 
# of obs.      699      699 
 
Panel C: idiosyncratic risk 
 Low (below median risk) High (above median risk) 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D CAPEX R&D 
Active family 0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.007 0.007 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 -0.008 
 (0.44) (-0.76) (0.43) (-0.83) (0.74) (-1.32) (1.21) (-0.59) (-0.6) (-0.88) (1.14) (-1.03) 
Passive family 0.006 0.001 -0.001 -0.002* 0.005 -0.001 0.007 0.020* -0.000 0.000 0.007 0.020* 
 (1.29) (0.26) (-0.99) (-1.81) (1.15) (-0.14) (1.49) (1.88) (-0.75) (0.2) (1.44) (1.9) 
Delta 0.001 -0.000   0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002   -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.69) (-0.21)   (0.69) (-0.21) (-0.18) (-0.83)   (-0.18) (-0.83) 
Vega 0.001 0.004**   0.001 0.004** 0.002* 0.001   0.002* 0.001 
 (0.51) (2.54)   (0.51) (2.54) (1.66) (0.5)   (1.66) (0.5) 
Equation-level R2     0.5321 0.3813     0.5083 0.4136 
             
 Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega Delta Vega 
Active family 1.069*** -0.427**   1.069*** -0.427** 1.113*** -0.439***   1.113*** -0.439*** 
 (5.91) (-2.12)   (5.91) (-2.12) (8.13) (-2.79)   (8.13) (-2.79) 
Passive family -0.400** -0.505***   -0.400** -0.505*** -0.096 -0.128   -0.096 -0.128 
 (-2.26) (-2.91)   (-2.26) (-2.91) (-0.8) (-0.96)   (-0.8) (-0.96) 
Equation-level R2     0.2946 0.1780     0.4010 0.0808 
Industry and Year F.E.       
& control variables   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.8284   0.8368 
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# of obs.      699      699 
See Table A.1 for variable definitions. 
This table uses three risk measures and reports separate structural equation model estimates of long-term corporate investments (measured as the two ratios of capital 
expenditure and R&D spending to total assets, respectively). The sample consists of 1,756 firm-year observations that represent 362 unique US small firms during the period 
of 2001-2005. Active family firm is controlled and run by founding family. Passive family firm is controlled but not run by founding family. Family firm consists of both 
active and passive family firms. Z-Values are in parentheses and are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering on the firm-level identifier. The 
symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A.7 
Family firms, CEO option sensitivities, and M&A activities (contingent on firm risks) 
Panel A: firm risk 
 Low (below median risk) High (above median risk) 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value 
Active family -0.038 -0.173 0.012 0.081 -0.025 -0.092 0.025 -0.107 0.004 0.019 0.029 -0.088 
 (-0.57) (-0.88) (0.51) (1.08) (-0.45) (-0.54) (0.43) (-0.59) (0.13) (0.23) (0.62) (-0.63) 
Passive family 0.138** 0.432** -0.006 -0.029 0.132** 0.403** 0.031 -0.022 -0.009 -0.018 0.022 -0.039 
 (2.24) (2.31) (-0.98) (-1.22) (2.17) (2.19) (0.63) (-0.13) (-1.09) (-0.95) (0.44) (-0.24) 
Delta 0.017 0.094*   0.017 0.094* 0.019 0.045   0.019 0.045 
 (0.92) (1.74)   (0.92) (1.74) (0.86) (0.66)   (0.86) (0.66) 
Vega 0.007 0.020   0.007 0.020 0.046** 0.082   0.046** 0.082 
 (0.43) (0.36)   (0.43) (0.36) (2.37) (1.37)   (2.37) (1.37) 
Equation-level R2     0.1174 0.0834     0.1006 0.0540 
Industry and Year F.E.       
& control variables   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.5539   0.5402 
# of obs.      839      838 
 
Panel B: market risk 
 Low (below median risk) High (above median risk) 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value 
Active family 0.044 -0.156 0.001 0.038 0.044 -0.118 -0.053 -0.305 0.028 0.125 -0.025 -0.180 
 (0.67) (-0.9) (0.04) (0.54) (0.78) (-0.78) (-0.84) (-1.51) (0.99) (1.4) (-0.49) (-1.09) 
Passive family 0.116* 0.251 -0.020 -0.048 0.096 0.203 0.046 -0.047 -0.003 -0.011 0.043 -0.059 
 (1.95) (1.32) (-1.62) (-1.36) (1.62) (1.08) (0.75) (-0.25) (-0.65) (-0.64) (0.71) (-0.31) 
Delta 0.017 0.067   0.017 0.067 0.024 0.106   0.024 0.106 
 (0.88) (1.1)   (0.88) (1.1) (1.18) (1.57)   (1.18) (1.57) 
Vega 0.029 0.045   0.029 0.045 0.002 0.004   0.002 0.004 
 (1.61) (0.89)   (1.61) (0.89) (0.1) (0.07)   (0.1) (0.07) 
Equation-level R2     0.1125 0.0809     0.0970 0.0727 
Industry and Year F.E.       
& control variables   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.5322   0.5001 
# of obs.      699      699 
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Panel C: idiosyncratic risk 
 Low (below median risk) High (above median risk) 
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value Number Value 
Active family -0.018 -0.288 0.027 0.174* 0.009 -0.114 0.012 -0.117 0.010 0.004 0.022 -0.113 
 (-0.28) (-1.38) (1.04) (1.96) (0.15) (-0.59) (0.19) (-0.67) (0.39) (0.05) (0.43) (-0.78) 
Passive family 0.138** 0.231 -0.013 -0.029 0.125* 0.202 0.005 -0.056 -0.005 -0.015 -0.000 -0.071 
 (2.07) (1.15) (-1.12) (-0.72) (1.89) (1.03) (0.1) (-0.33) (-0.84) (-0.84) (-0.01) (-0.42) 
Delta 0.027 0.141**   0.027 0.141** 0.019 0.039   0.019 0.039 
 (1.32) (2.09)   (1.32) (2.09) (0.96) (0.65)   (0.96) (0.65) 
Vega 0.004 -0.055   0.004 -0.055 0.026 0.090*   0.026 0.090* 
 (0.24) (-0.87)   (0.24) (-0.87) (1.43) (1.8)   (1.43) (1.8) 
Equation-level R2     0.1476 0.1194     0.0960 0.0638 
Industry and Year F.E.       
& control variables   Yes   Yes 
Model R2   0.5287   0.5085 
# of obs.      699      699 
See Table A.1 for variable definitions. 
This table uses three risk measures and reports separate structural equation model estimates of M&A activities. M&A activities are measured as ln(1+M&A number) and 
ln(1+ sum of M&A deal value), respectively. The sample consists of 1,756 firm-year observations that represent 362 unique US small firms during the period of 2001-2005. 
Active family firm is controlled and run by founding family. Passive family firm is controlled but not run by founding family. Family firm consists of both active and passive 
family firms. Z-Values are in parentheses and are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by clustering on the firm-level identifier. All specifications control for 
industry (1-digit SIC codes) and year fixed effects. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table A.8 
Robustness Checks: R&D outcomes 
Panel A: R&D input and output 
  Mean Min. P50 Max. Number of obs. 
R&D missing Patents filed 0.37 0 0 19 626 
 Patent citation 1.71 0 0 79 626 
R&D = 0 Patents filed 0.01 0 0 1 235 
 Patent citation 0.02 0 0 3 235 
R&D > 0 Patents filed 4.41 0 1 83 895 
 Patent citation 30.76 0 0 1,511 895 
 
Panel B: R&D input/output and family firms 
  Active Family Firms Passive Family Firms  Non Family firms 
R&D missing Patents filed 0.22 0.35 0.50 
 Patent citation 0.74 1.33 2.56 
 % of obs. 33.87% 19.17% 46.96% 
R&D = 0 Patents filed 0.00 0.02 0.01 
 Patent citation 0.00 0.05 0.01 
 % of obs. 27.66% 23.40% 48.94% 
R&D > 0 Patents filed 3.70 4.94 4.60 
 Patent citation 30.22 34.52 29.09 
 % of obs. 30.06% 24.58% 45.36% 
 
Panel C: Patents       
 Direct Effect Indirect Effect Total Effect 
 Number Citation Number Citation Number Citation 
Active family -0.170 -0.306* 0.034 0.076 -0.136 -0.231 
 (-1.64) (-1.75) (0.75) (1) (-1.46) (-1.48) 
Passive family 0.077 0.112 -0.019 -0.027 0.058 0.085 
 (0.72) (0.68) (-1.55) (-1.42) (0.55) (0.51) 
Delta 0.048 0.089   0.048 0.089 
 (1.45) (1.61)   (1.45) (1.61) 
Vega 0.034 0.040   0.034 0.040 
 (1.21) (0.83)   (1.21) (0.83) 
Firm size -0.106** -0.209*** 0.018** 0.030** -0.088* -0.179** 
 (-2.13) (-2.62) (1.99) (2.06) (-1.8) (-2.28) 
Tobin’s Q 0.004 -0.014 0.028* 0.049** 0.032 0.035 
 (0.09) (-0.21) (1.89) (1.98) (0.74) (0.5) 
Firm age -0.132* -0.203*   -0.132* -0.203* 
 (-1.8) (-1.73)   (-1.8) (-1.73) 
Cash ratio 0.081 0.046   0.081 0.046 
 (0.23) (0.08)   (0.23) (0.08) 
Leverage ratio 0.236 0.302   0.236 0.302 
 (0.95) (0.69)   (0.95) (0.69) 
Asset tangibility -0.474** -0.799**   -0.474** -0.799** 
 (-2.14) (-2.29)   (-2.14) (-2.29) 
Dividend ratio -2.141 -2.988   -2.141 -2.988 
 (-0.97) (-0.86)   (-0.97) (-0.86) 
CEO duality   0.021** 0.033** 0.021** 0.033** 
   (2.07) (1.98) (2.07) (1.98) 
CEO age   -0.005 0.016 -0.005 0.016 
   (-0.1) (0.19) (-0.1) (0.19) 
Cash pay   0.017 0.023 0.017 0.023 
   (1.46) (1.23) (1.46) (1.23) 
Equation-level R2     0.2063 0.1938 
Industry and Year F.E.   Yes 
Model R2   0.5704 
# of obs.      1,756 
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Table A.9 
Robustness Checks: alternative model estimations 
 Tobit model Heckman model Tobit model (IV) 
  (control for self-selection) 1st stage: 
Family 
2nd stage:  
R&D 
1st stage: 
Family 
2nd stage:  
R&D 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Delta -0.008** -0.006 -0.006* -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.006***     
 (-2.41) (-1.62) (-1.68) (-3.63) (-2.69) (-3.28)     
Vega 0.007** 0.006** 0.007** 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.240*** 0.011*** 0.180*** -0.001 
 (2.31) (2.14) (2.31) (1.6) (1.4) (1.26) (8.44) (4.92) (6.76) (-0.51) 
Vega*Family 0.001   -0.000       
 (0.57)   (-0.04)       
Vega*Active family  -0.002   -0.002   -0.025***   
  (-0.81)   (-1.44)   (-4.07)   
Vega*Passive family  0.005*   0.002     0.035*** 
  (1.82)   (1.3)     (3.99) 
Vega*Active family ownership   -0.001   0.000     
   (-0.86)   (0.2)     
Vega*Passive family ownership   0.002   0.002*     
   (1)   (1.94)     
Firm size -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.052 -0.033*** 0.080* -0.035*** 
 (-6.04) (-6.36) (-6.08) (-3.92) (-3.98) (-3.73) (-1.14) (-13.24) (1.88) (-12.91) 
Tobin’s Q 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.000 0.010*** 0.089** 0.007*** 
 (2.96) (2.66) (2.8) (4.48) (4.17) (4.37) (-0.01) (4.57) (2.22) (2.8) 
Firm age -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.456*** -0.018*** -0.009 -0.007* 
 (-1.38) (-1.5) (-1.56) (-3.04) (-3.24) (-3.13) (-7.66) (-4.39) (-0.15) (-1.89) 
Cash ratio 0.048 0.045 0.046 0.037** 0.035** 0.035** -0.355 0.038** 0.077 0.043** 
 (1.43) (1.36) (1.36) (2.3) (2.19) (2.22) (-0.99) (2.07) (0.23) (2.23) 
Leverage ratio -0.011 -0.005 -0.008 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.148 0.004 -0.190 0.007 
 (-0.45) (-0.2) (-0.33) (0.88) (1.19) (0.91) (0.58) (0.3) (-0.8) (0.44) 
Asset tangibility -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.104*** -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.128 -0.107*** 0.365* -0.119*** 
 (-3.96) (-4.09) (-4.01) (-4.05) (-3.98) (-4.03) (-0.55) (-6.9) (1.68) (-7.27) 
Dividend ratio -0.349 -0.360 -0.342 -0.136 -0.126 -0.127 -1.355 -0.363*** 4.899*** -0.499*** 
 (-1.55) (-1.55) (-1.53) (-1.41) (-1.31) (-1.32) (-0.76) (-3.63) (2.93) (-4.36) 
CEO duality    -0.010*** -0.009** -0.009** 0.662***  -0.488***  
    (-2.63) (-2.29) (-2.53) (8.97)  (-7.05)  
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Industry and Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2       0.1301  0.0681  
F-test 13.90*** 13.23*** 13.40***    12.93***  6.83***  
Wald Chi^2    168.64*** 175.68*** 174.07***  742.63***  679.67*** 
Mill’s lambda    0.0128 
(0.76) 
0.0098 
(0.58) 
0.0090 
(0.53) 
    
Wald test of exogeneity        12.60***  14.21*** 
# of obs. 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,753 1,753 1,753 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 
See Table A.1 for variable definitions. This table reports robustness checks on the relations between family incentive pay and long-term corporate investments (measured as 
the patent number/citation in Panel A and the ratio of R&D spending to total assets in Panel B). The sample consists of 1,756 firm-year observations that represent 362 
unique US small firms during the period of 2001-2005. Active family firm is controlled and run by founding family. Passive family firm is controlled but not run by founding 
family. Family firm consists of both active and passive family firms. In Panel A, Z-Values are in parentheses and are corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity by 
clustering on the firm-level identifier. In Panel B Models 1-6, T-Values (Z-Values for the Heckman models) are in parentheses and are corrected for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity by clustering on the firm-level identifier (except for the three Heckman models). In Panel B Models 7-10, T-Values (for the first stage estimates) and Z-
Values (for the second stage estimates) are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Figure A.5 
Contour plots of firm age, family ownership, and vega in three types of family firms 
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